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The Americans with Disabilities
Act after Sutton v. United Air Lines-
Can It Live Up to Its Promise of Freedom
for Disabled Americans?
BY ASHLEY L. PAcK!
INTRODUCTION
en years afterits enactment, the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") is still being hotly litigated. Touted as a measure to
protect those whom "society has tended to isolate and segre-
gate," the ADA has proven to be a treacherous area of law in which
plaintiffs have faced a difficult burden of proof in order to prevail. A
comprehensive statistical analysis of cases under the ADA reported that
"defendants prevail in more than 93 percent of reported ADA employment
discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of those
cases appealed, defendants prevail in 84 percent of reported cases. The
statistics... are stark in showing plaintiffs' lack of success under the
[A]Ct. 12
In a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, Sutton v. UnitedAir
Lines, Inc.,3 plaintiffs' burdenbecame even more difficult to meet. Ignoring
the ADA's legislative history,4 federal agency guidelines,' traditional
judicial deference to agency findings, 6 and decisions from a vast majority
J.D. expected 2001, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
David and Louise Cleek and Marilyn T. McClure-Demers for their continued
support and guidance.
42 U.S.C. § 1210 1(a)(2) (1994).
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, Unfulfilled Promise: The Americans with Disabilities
Act, TRIAL, Sept. 1999, at 88.
3 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
4 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text
I See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 51, 160 and accompanying text
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of the circuit courts,7 the Court concluded that a person's impairment
should be evaluated in a mitigated or corrected state when determining if
that person is disabled under the Act.8 The hoopla and hope that heralded
the ADA's passage has all but vanished, as this decision has significantly
narrowed the Act's coverage. Many intended plaintiffs now find them-
selves excluded from the ADA's protection, leaving the Act that was
originally passed as "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities*
powerless to effectuate its intended goal. Sutton, cited as "a significant
victory for employers,"10 forces plaintiffs to determine ways in which to
minimie the force of this decision.
This Note focuses on the impact that the Supreme Court's decision in
Sutton has had upon the ADA, with an emphasis upon Title I employment
discrimination. A thorough understanding of the background of the ADA
is helpful in interpreting Sutton and appreciating the gravity of the Supreme
Court's actions in rejecting the Act's legislative history and the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC') guidelines promulgated
to interpret the Act. Consequently, Part I of this Note reviews the purpose
of the ADA, its legislative history, and the EEOC guidelines.II Part II then
investigates the circuit split on the issue of whether to take mitigating
measures into account when determining whether an individual is
"disabled" under the ADA.12 Part III examines the facts and majority
decision of Sutton and provides an assessment of the Court's holding. 3 Part
IV focuses on the implications of this significant decision, with particular
emphasis on methods plaintiffs should employ to minimize its pro-
defendant bias.14
I. HISTORY OF THE ADA
Enacted on July 26, 1990, the ADA was designed to prohibit covered
entities from discriminating against disabled individuals because of their
7 See infra Part I.8 See infra Part Ill.B.
9 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
'
0 Robert Lewis, Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Coverage Under the ADA,
EMP. L. STRATEGIST, July 1999, at 2.
"See infra notes 15-58 and accompanying text.
,
2 See infra notes 59-86 and accompanying text.
,
3 See infra notes 87-163 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 164-78 and accompanying text'
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disabilities. 5 Consistent with this general purpose, the ADA also sought to
furnish"a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities"' 6 and to establish
"clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards" for identifying and
addressing such discrimination.' 7
One of the central areas in which the ADA's drafters sought to protect
handicapped individuals from discrimination was the workplace.' 8 It has
been an unfortunate historical reality that disabled individuals have faced
isolation and segregation from society in many areas of employment. 9 At
the time of the ADA's enactment, only twenty-six percent of America's
forty-three million disabled individuals" were employed full time, yet
sixty- to seventy-percent desired full-time work.2' Clearly, some disabled
Americans have been precluded from the satisfaction, both financial and
personal, that full-time work can provide?2
15 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The legislative history of the ADA
appears in the following congressional reports: Senate Labor and Human Re-
sources Committee Report, S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989); House Public Works
and Transportation Committee Report, HILR. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 267; House Education and Labor Commit-
tee Report, H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303; House Judiciary Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445; House Energy and Commerce Committee
Report, H.R.REP. No. 101-485, pt. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512;
and the Conference Reports, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-558 (1990), 1990 WL
259240; H. CONF. REP. No. 101-596 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
565.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
'
7 Id. § 12102(b)(2).
'
8 Seeid. §§ 12101 - 12117.
191d. § 12101(a)(2).
2 While Congress cited the number of Americans who "have one or more phy-
sical or mental disabilities" at forty-three million, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000),
this number seems destined to grow, due to both the aging of the nation's
population and the increase in the number of employees injured on the job.
Eric Wade Richardson, Comment, Who Is a Qualified Individual with a Disabi-
lity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 189, 189
(1995).
21 Richardson, supra note 20, at 189 (citing Peter M. Burkery, Jr., The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act; Its Impact on Small Business, NAT'L PUB. ACCT., Sept.
1990, at 42).
' See id.
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Because the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against any
"qualified individual with a disability,"23 the statute's definition of a
disability is crucial to an understanding of the ADA's coverage. The ADA
categorizes a "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment."24 However, the Act fails to define essential
terms such as "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits," or
"major life activities."25 The absence of definitions for these key terms has
resulted in multiple difficulties in achieving a clear and comprehensive
understanding of the Act.
The legislative history of the ADA provides a possible basis for its
interpretation: courts evaluating the ADA could follow the regulations
established under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26 In addition, because the
23 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 -12117. Specifically, Title I of the ADA provides
that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privilege of
employment." Id. § 12112(a). Title I goes on to define "qualified individual with
a disability" as someone "with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8).
Title II, which deals with public services, establishes that "[s]ubject to the
provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity." Id. § 12132.
24 Id. § 12102(2).
' Although the ADA failed to define these terms, it did expressly exempt cer-
tain conditions from its "disability" definition. Id. § 1221 1(b). See also infra note
46 and accompanying text.
26 The Rehabilitation Act provides that
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
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intent27 and language of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are similar,
courts interpreting the ADA often look to judicial decisions involving the
Rehabilitation Act for guidance.29
In determining the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act, various
courts have defined "disability" to include: epilepsy, 0 cardiovascular
disease,3 former drug use,3 2 psychiatric problems,33 legal blindness,
34
manic depressive syndrome,35 ankylosing spondylitis,36 nervous and heart
conditions, 37 multiple sclerosis,38 blindness in one eye,39 heart condition,40
osteoarthritis of the knee joints,41 cerebral palsy and dyslexia,42 leg
amputation,43 and unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke." The ADA and its
legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended "disability" to
encompass muscular dystrophy, AIDS or HV, mental retardation,
2 The Rehabilitation Act was passed to "prohibit public sector employers from
discriminating against mentally and physically disabled individuals." Alysa M.
Barancik, Comment, Determining Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA:
Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an "Interactive Process,"
30 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 513,520 (1999) (citing JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M.
STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION 63 (3d ed. 1993)).
Since the Rehabilitation Act only applied to public sector employees, Congress
enacted the ADA to extend disability discrimination coverage to disabled workers
in the private sector. Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
2 Congress used much ofthe language from the Rehabilitation Act to draft Title
I of the ADA, since both dealt with disabilities in the workplace. Id. (citing
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 27, at 961).
29Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).30 Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36
(S.D. Iowa 1984).
3 1 Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
32 Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp 791, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
33 Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
I See Norcoss v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985).35 See Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985).
36 See Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1985).
31 See Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983).
38SeePushkin v. Regents oftheUniv. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
31 Holly v. City of Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
° Bento v. I.T.O. Corp. of R.I., 599 F. Supp. 731,741 (D.LI. 1984).
41 See Guinn v. Bolger, 598 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1984).
42 Fitzgerald v. Green Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D.
Iowa 1984).
43 Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102, 103 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
' Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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alcoholism, and emotional illness,"s but did not intend the term to cover
transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania,
or use of illegal drugs."
Although this list provides some guidance in evaluating whether a
particular condition might be considered a disability under the ADA, it
provides no insight into the mitigation issue. The use of mitigating
measures can curb the seriousness of many of the conditions listed above,
but the ADA fails to expressly address whether conditions that can be
controlled or nearly eliminated by mitigation can be considered "disabili-
ties" under the Act. Thus, it becomes necessary to look outside the Act to
determine whether mitigated conditions can be considered disabilities.
A. The ADA 's Legislative History and the Mitigation Issue
The legislative history of the Act repeatedly indicates that a disability
should be evaluated in its unmitigated state. The Senate Report regarding
the ADA states that "whether a person has a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reason-
able accomodations or auxiliary aids."47 Similarly, according to the Report
of the House Committee on Education and Labor:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommoda-
tions or auxiliary aids. For example, a person who is hard of hearing is
substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the
loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons
with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit
a major life activity are covered under... the definition of disability,
even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication. 8
The House Judiciary Committee Report employed like language: "The
impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating
4s H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 333.
442 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (1994).
47 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
48 HJ. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334.
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measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would
result in a less-than-substantial limitation."4 9
B. Agency Interpretation of the Role ofMitigating Measures
In addition to the legislative history of the ADA, agency regulations
also provide some insight into the mitigation issue. To assist in the ADA's
implementation, the Act itself charged the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") with promulgating regulations and interpretative
guidance for Title I of the ADA.5' Pursuant to this statutory delegation,
courts should defer to the EEOC's determinations unless such determina-
tions are found "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."'" The EEOC, while defining "disability" with terminology
identical to that used in the ADA's definition,5 went on to elaborate upon
the definition's key terms. A "physical or mental impairment" was
characterized as:
[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or [a]ny mental or psychologi-
cal disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.5
The EEOC explained that "major life activities" include "functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
49 H.R. EP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445,451.
50 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
sI Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
52 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2000).
53 Id. § 1630.2(h). "For example, an individual with epilepsy would be con-
sidered to have an impairment even if the symptoms of the disorder were
completely controlled by medicine. Similarly, an individual with hearing loss
would be considered to have an impairment even if the condition were correctable
through the use of a hearing aid." Id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
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hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."54 Further, the EEOC
defined "substantially limits" as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity.55
In addition, the EEOC issued an Interpretive Guidance, which stated
that "[tlhe determination of whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices. ' 6 The Department of Justice, charged with promulgating
regulations implementing Title II,' agreed with the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance, noting that "[tihe question of whether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and services." '
As will be discussed later in this Note, the Supreme Court ignored this
guidance in the first case that put the mitigating measures issue before the
Court.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A decisive majority of federal circuits prior to Sutton had addressed the
mitigating measure issue favorably to plaintiffs' claims. These courts,
s Id. § 1630.2(i) (2000). The Supreme Court recently added reproduction to
this list, which it called "illustrative, not exhaustive." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 639 (1998).
55 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (2000). In determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity, the EEOC listed three relevant factors:
"(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment" Id.
§ 1630.26)(2).
S6 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2G) (1998).
57 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994).
58 29 C.F.R pt. 35, app. A, § 35.104 (1998).
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which included the First,59 Second,6 Third 6 1 Seventh 62 Eighth,63 Ninth,64
and Eleventh 6s Circuits, determined that mitigating measures should not be
considered when evaluating whether aperson was disabled underthe Act.'
In so concluding, these courts based their decisions primarily on the
legislative history of the Act and the EEOC regulations and guidelines, in
accordance with the principle of agency deference.67
The Fifth Circuit, in Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas,
Inc.,68 reached an intermediate position by concluding that the appropriate-
ness of considering mitigating measures in a disability determination
depends upon the characteristics of the disability and mitigating measure
at issue.69 The court in Washington deferred to the legislative history and
EEOC Guidelines, but interpreted them narrowly." While noting that (1)
the EEOC had sufficient expertise to interpret the ADA and had consis-
tently maintained that mitigating measures should not be considered, and
(2) the ADA's legislative history was consistent with the EEOC Guide-
lines, the court recognized situations where mitigating measures should be
9 Arnold v. United Postage Sew., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1998).
6Bartlettv. N.Y. State Bd. ofLaw Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321,329 (2d Cir. 1998),
vacated by 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). Bartlett involved a claim under Title H, rather
than Title I, of the ADA. Id. at 328. Nonetheless, at least one lower court within the
Second Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Bartlett court in the Title I
context. See Schaeferv. State Ins. Fund, No. 95 Civ. 0612(JFK), 1998 WL 126061,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998), vacated by 207 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2000).
61 Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir.
1997).
6 Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998).63 Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997).
6 Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996).
6S Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
"In addition to these circuits, lower courts in the Fourth and D.C. Circuits had
also concluded that mitigating measures should not be considered. Fallacaro v.
Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 92-93 (D.D.C. 1997); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc
Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997), affldper curiam,
151 F.3d 1030 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table opinion).
'
7See supra notes 59-66.
68 Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir.
1998), vacated by 527 U.S. 1032 (1999).
691 Id. at 470-71. Prior to its decision in Washington, the Fifth Circuit had hinted,
albeit in dicta, that it might favor considering mitigating measures. Ellison v.
Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996).
" Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
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considered.71 The Fifth Circuit restricted application of the legislative
history and EEOC Guidelines by ruling that "only serious impairments and
ailments that are analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC Guidelines
and the legislative history... will be considered in their mitigated state."72
The court concluded that only mitigating measures that are used repeatedly
and regularly, such as daily medication or prosthesis, could be ignored in
the disability determination. 7 Mitigating measures that amount to
permanent corrections, on the other hand, must be considered. 74 In this
manner, the court distinguished between continuous impairments such as
diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing impairments, which it said should be
evaluated in an unmitigated condition, and permanent corrections such as
hip replacements and transplanted organs, which should be evaluated in a
mitigated condition.7 Applying this standard to the facts at hand, the Fifth
Circuit determined that an employee afflicted with Adult Stills Disease,
which is a degenerative rheumatoid condition that affects bones and joints,
must be evaluated for disability in an unmitigated state.76
While the Fifth Circuit questioned the reasonableness of ignoring
mitigating measures in the disability determination, the court stopped short
of outright disregarding the legislative history and EEOC guidelines.77 The
Sixth Circuit, however, became the only circuit court prior to Sutton to
entirely reject the ADA's legislative history and EEOC Guidelines.78 In a
badly fractured opinion, the Sixth Circuit decided by a 2-1 margin that
mitigating measures shouldbe considered in anADA disability determina-
71 Id.
72 Id.
7 Id.
74 Id. at 470-71.
75 Id. at 471.76 Id. No reported case employing the Fifth Circuit's Washington framework
ever used it to conclude that a plaintiffs disability should be evaluated in a
mitigated state. See Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, Tex., 176 F.3d 834, 837
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the disability determination for a plaintiff with a
diabetic condition should be made without considering the effect of mitigating
measures); Pate v. Baker Tanks Gulf S., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (W.D. La.
1999) (holding that mitigating measures should not be considered in evaluating a
plaintiff with diabetes); Ahl v. Univ. of Miss., No. l:96CV304-S-D, 1999 WL
1068597, at *3 (N.D. Miss. May 4, 1999) (niling that a plaintiff who was unable
to speak without a mechanical device because his larynx had been removed should
be examined in an unmitigated state).
77 Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
'1 Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
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tion29 Still, no other circuit had adopted this view prior to Sutton, leaving
the weight of precedent squarely on the side of ignoring mitigating
measures when determining an individual's disability.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc8 0 broke
sharply with the overwhelming majority of other circuits8 ' and agency
interpretations.' The court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, in doing so, turned
away from the reasoning of a majority ofthe federal circuits. The plaintiffs
alleged that United Air Lines had violated the ADA by rejecting their
applications for employment on the basis of a disability or, alternatively,
by rejecting them because it regarded them as having a disability.83 The
Tenth Circuit held that mitigating measures should always be taken into
account when determining whether an individual's impairment substan-
tially limits a major life activity. 4 The court concluded that the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance conflicted with the plain meaning of the ADA and
79 Id. at 767-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
768 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Gilday case was heard
by a panel of three judges-Kennedy, Guy and Moore--each of whom penned an
opinion. Judge Moore delivered the judgment of the court and the opinion of the
court except as to the mitigating measures issue. Id. at 761. Judge Moore argued
that mitigating measures should never be considered, but was not joined in this
belief by either Judge Kennedy or Moore. Id. at 762-65; id. at 767-68 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 768 (Guy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Judge Kennedy argued for a wholesale rejection of the
legislative history andInterpretive Guidelines as inconsistentwith the statutory text
and EEOC regulations. Id. at 767-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Guy also disagreed with Judge Moore's assessment that
mitigating measures should never be considered. Id. at 768 (Guy, 3., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). But while Judge Guy's opinion seemed to agree with
that of Judge Kennedy, it also seemed to leave room for application of an
interpretive framework similar to the Fifth Circuit's Washington rubric. Id. ("In my
view, the impact of mitigating measures must be decided on a case-by-case
basis."). See also Washington, 152F.3dat471 n.1 1 (equating its approachwith that
of Judge Guy).
80 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 527
U.S. 471 (1999).
8! See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
82See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
83 Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
4Id. at 902.
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rejected it.85 The Tenth Circuit's decision created a conflict that the
Supreme Court deemed worthy of certiorari. 6
Ill. SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES
A. Facts
After their complaint was dismissed by the Tenth Circuit, Ms. Sutton
and Ms. Hinton, twin sisters who suffered from severe myopia, appealed
to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. Petitioners' uncorrected
visual acuity was 20/200 or worse in their right eyes and 20/400 or worse
in their left eyes, but both petitioners' vision improved to 20/20 with
corrective lenses.87 The sisters had applied for employment as commercial
airline pilots with the respondent, United Air Lines.8 The petitioners
fulfilled the basic requirements for the position, such as age, education,
experience, and FAA certification. 9 At their interviews, however, the
petitioners were told that they did not meet the airline's minimum vision
requirement of20/100 uncorrected visual acuity, and their interviews were
terminated without an offer of employment. 0 The petitioners subsequently
alleged that the airline's stated justification for refusing to hire them
violated the ADA.9'
As outlined above, to establish a claim under the ADA a plaintiff must
show that he or she is (1) disabled (within the meaning of the ADA); (2)
qualified for employment (able to perform the essential functions of the
job, with or without reasonable accommodation); and (3) discriminated
against by the employer in an employment decision because of his or her
alleged disability.9 In Sutton, the petitioners argued for the interpretation
of "disability" already adopted by a majority of the circuits--that an
impairment should be determined without regard to corrective measures. 3
They maintained that since the ADA did not directly address the issue,
85 Id.
86 See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 525 U.S. 1063 (1999).
87 Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,475 (1999).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 475-76.
90Id. at 476.
91 Id.
I Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omit-
ted).
93 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
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courts should defer to federal agency interpretations of the Act.94 Thus, the
sisters argued, the Supreme Court should define impairment or disability
without regard to mitigating measures.95 The petitioners claimed that they
possessed the qualifications for the positions of commercial airline pilots
and that United Air Lines had discriminated against them in an employ-
ment decision due to their alleged disability; therefore, the only remaining
issue was whether the petitioners were disabled persons within the meaning
of the ADA.
The respondent, on the other hand, argued that an impairment should
not be evaluated in its unmitigated state.97 Claiming that "an impairment
does not substantially limit a major life activity if it is corrected," 8 United
Air Lines argued that the ADA's phrase "substantially limits one or more
major life activities" only made sense if the substantial limitations
"actually and presently exist."" The respondent's position was that the
Court should ignore the agency guidelines because they conflicted with the
plain meaning of the ADA. 0
B. Majority Opinion
By a 7-2 margin, the Supreme Court adopted the Tenth Circuit's
position and held that mitigating measures should be taken into account
when determining whether an individual is disabled under the ADA.'0 '
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, rested her
decision on three main points. First, Justice O'Connor noted that "[b]e-
cause the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the present
indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring
that apersonbepresently-notpotentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability."'' Thus, the majority opinion
concluded that a disability does not exist where a physical or mental
9'1d.; see also Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natura Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to agency interpretation unless
it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute").
9 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
9 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id.
100 Id. at 481-82.
101 Id. at 475.
102 Id. at 482.
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impairment "might," "could," or "would" substantially limit a major life
activity if not for mitigating measures. 03 Justice O'Connor concluded that
a person whose disability was corrected by mitigating measures, while still
saddled with the original impairment, cannot be disabled under the ADA
because a corrected impairment does not "substantially limit" a major life
activity. 104
The Court further relied on the statutory definition of a disability to
determine that disabilities should be assessed "with respect to an
individual."'05 The majority arguedthat this individualized inquiry conflicts
with the agency guidelines requiring individuals to be evaluated in their
unmitigated states."° Justice O'Connor wrote that the agency guidelines
force* "employers to speculate about a person's condition and would, in
many cases, force them to make a disability determination based on general
information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects
individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition."107 Therefore,
the majority opinion concluded that the agency approach was "contrary to
both the letter and spirit of the ADA' ' 0 8 because it "would create a system
in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of people
with similar impairments, rather than as individuals."' 9 Because of this
determination, the Court declined to consider the legislative history of the
ADA in addressing this issue. 0
Justice O'Connor's third point addressed Congress's findings in
enacting the ADA. In its findings, Congress stated that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities."'1" The Court
had difficulty determining the source ofthis number, "2 but after evaluating
several potential sources concluded that the forty-three million figure
"reflect[ed] an understanding that those whose impairments are largely
103 Id.
104 Id. at 483.
105 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1995)).
106 Id.
'MId. The dissent argued that the majority's approach treats individuals as
members of a group and not as true individuals. The dissent further maintained that
examining an individual in an unmitigated state isno more difficult than examining
the individual in a mitigated state. Id. at 508-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 484.
109 Id. at 483-84.
10 Id. at 482.
1 Id. at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)).
112Id.
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corrected by medication or other devices are not 'disabled' within the
meaning of the ADA." The majority opinion then attempted to buttress
this conclusion by the somewhat specious reasoning that if Congress had
intended to include all persons with mitigated or corrected disabilities
within the Act, it would have cited a higher number of disabled persons in
its findings. 1 4
The Court criticized the dissent's suggestion that the majority opinion
would exclude from the definition of disability those who use prosthetic
limbs or take medicine for epilepsy or high blood pressure."5 Justice
O'Connor explained that "[t]he use of a corrective device does not, by
itself, relieve one's disability""' 6 if the individual, with the mitigating
measure (such as a prosthetic limb), remains substantially limited in a
13 Id. at 486,
"
4Id. at 487. This argument is somewhat dubious for two reasons. First, as the
dissent pointed out, the Court had previously made clear "that a 'statement of
congressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base' a statutory
construction." led at 511 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat'l Org. for Women,
Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,260 (1994)).
Second, the majority, failing to locate any direct source for Congress' forty-
three million figure, essentiallV engaged in a numerical balancing of figures from
outside studies. Id. at 484-87. The Court weighed figures from studies using a
functional (mitigating) definition of disability against estimates from studies using
a disability definition similar to an unmitigated assessment. Id. Even though the
Court proved unable to unearth any figures that closely matched the number used
by Congress, the majority reasoned that, because the figures used in the former
group were numerically closer to forty-three million than were the estimates of the
latter group, Congress must have intended that mitigating measures be considered.
Id. It is quite likely, however, that the Court's estimates of covered individuals
under an unmitigated disability definition are inflated because they fail to exclude
impairments that are not substantially igniting. Id. at 511-12 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the Court's circuitous attempt to ascertain Congressional
intent from a potentially flawed numerical comparison seems quite strained,
especially since the legislative history clearly states thatmitigating measures should
have no part in disability determinations. H.L REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3,
at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23
(1989).
" H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
445,451.
16 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
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major life activity, since the individual would still be considered disabled
under the Court's analysis."7
After determining that the petitioners had failed to state a claim that
they were disabled under subsection (A), which characterizes a disability
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual,"'" s the Court next evaluated
the facts under subsection (C), which covers individuals "regarded as
having such impairment."'" Subsection (C) provides two potential routes
by which an individual may qualify: "(1) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or
more major life activities.' ' 20 This subsection seeks to remedy the
"stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of... individual ability,"
'121
which Congress had recognized could be just "as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."'"
The Court in Sutton dismissed the petitioners' argument that the airline
"mistakenly believe[d] their physical impairments substantially limit[ed]
them in the major life activity of working. '' 23 The sisters did not argue that
the airline regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity
of seeing, but only that United was mistaken in its belief that they were
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.2 Thus,
petitioners argued that respondent's vision requirement was "based on
mythand stereotype ' 1"5 andthat this requirement substantially limitedthem
in their ability to work as global airline pilots.'2 6 The Court maintained that
"[s]tanding alone, the allegation that respondent has a vision requirement
in place does not establish a claim."' 27 In fact, the majority opinion noted
that "the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over
117 Id.
'is 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
19 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994)).
120 Id.
121 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
122 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).
123Id at 49 0.
12 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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others."'' According to Justice O'Connor, the ADA is only implicated
when the employer"makes an employment decision based on a physical or
mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as substantially
limiting a major life activity. ' 19
The Court usedthe EEOC's interpretation to provide a definition of the
term "substantially limits" in conjunction with the major life activity of
working. 3 This EEOC interpretation classifies "substantially limits" as
being restricted from performing a broad class of jobs, and not merely
unable to perform a particular job.'3 ' The majority concluded that since a
global airline pilot constituted merely a single job among many that utilize
the sisters' skills, the petitioners were not substantially limited in the major
life activity of working.12
C. Companion Cases
Along with the Sutton decision, the Supreme Court decided two
companion cases that will also shape future ADA litigation. In the first of
these companion cases, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,'33 the
plaintiff suffered from high blood pressure."" Murphy's untreated blood
pressure was 250/160, but medication prevented his hypertension from
significantly limiting his major life activities. 35
Murphy sought employment with United Parcel Service ("UPS") as a
mechanic, a position that necessitated that he drive commercial motor
vehicles. 136 To drive these vehicles, Murphy had to satisfy certain
Department of Transportation regulations, one of which mandated "no
current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with
[the] ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely."'137 UPS mistakenly
grantedMurphy a Department of Transportation certification, even though
he had high blood pressure. 3 1 When the employer discovered its error,
Murphy was fired.' 39
128 Id.
129 Id.
'
3 D Id. at 491.
131 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2()(3)(i) (2000).
132 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
133 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
134 1d. at 519.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. (quoting 49 C.F. § 391.41(b)(6) (1998)).
3 Id. at 520.
139 Id.
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Consequently, Murphy filed suit against UPS, alleging a violation of
the ADA.140 The U.S. District Court forthe District ofKansas dismissedhis
claim and the Tenth Circuit affirmed."' The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower courts' rulings based on its decision in Sutton."
In the second case, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg," Kirkingburg
worked for Albertson's, Inc. as a truck driver. 1' Kirkingburg had an
uncorrectable condition, amblyopia, that resultedin visual acuity of 20/200
in his left eye.145 In contrast, the federal vision requirement for commercial
truck drivers was corrected visual acuity of 20/40 in each eye.'" Kirking-
burg was hired after a doctor mistakenly certified that Kirkingburg met the
vision requirement. 47 He was fired two years later, however, when the
error was discovered. 14 Kirkingburg brought suit alleging an ADA
violation. 149 The Ninth Circuit rejected the employer's argument and
concluded that Kirkingburg did have a disability.5 0 The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, once again relying upon the Sutton
case.' The Court concluded that Kirkingburg's brain had developed
mechanisms to compensate for his visual impairments-thus, his own body
mitigated his disability.1n
BothMurphy andKirkingburg further strengthen the opinion in Sutton.
Unlike the relatively easy case of correctable myopia present in Sutton,
these cases dealt with more well-accepted disabilities. The plaintiff in
Murphy battled high blood pressure, a condition that can be life-threatening
if left untreated. While most people can use medication to manage the
condition, it bears the potential for deadly consequences--quite unlike the
vision problems involved in Sutton. The Kirkingburg decision carries
significant ramifications, as it extended the notion of mitigating measures
to internal mitigation. Under the Kirkingburg holding, a person cannot be
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 521-25.
" Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
144 Id. at 558.
145 Id. at 559.
4 Id. at 558-59 (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 6458, 6463 (1970); 57 Fed. Reg. 6793,
6794 (1992); and 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(10) (1998)).
14 7 Id. at 559.
148 Id. at 559-60.
149 Id.
50 Id. at 561.
"I1Id. at 562-67.
152Id. at 565-66.
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considered disabled under the ADA if his body somehow adapts to combat
his otherwise disabling characteristic. The further narrowing ofthe ADA's
coverage by virtue of these two companion cases renders the Sutton
reasoning an even more entrenched and difficult hurdle for potential
plaintiffs.
D. Assessment
Although the majority's opinion seems to make sense at face value, the
Court loses sight of the ADA's goals. The ADA was intended to protect a
discrete and insular minority-one that had suffered from discrimination
in every aspect, economically and socially.'m The Court's narrow
interpretation is inconsistent with the Act's original remedial purpose.'m
Justice Stevens's dissent captured the significance of this action: "in order
to be faithful to the remedial purpose of the Act, we should give it a
generous, rather than a miserly, construction."155 In fact, in its miserly
construction, the Court ignored both the legislative history of the Act and
traditional judicial deference to agency findings. 56
The Court completely disregarded the legislative history of the Act,
substituting its own definition of disability for that provided by the ADA's
drafters. The dissenters noted that "[a]ll of the Reports... are replete with
references to the understanding that the Act's protected class includes
individuals with various medical conditions that ordinarily are perfectly
'correctable' with medication or treatment.""' Additionally, each of the
three agencies responsible for implementing the ADA-the EEOC, the
Justice Department, and the Department of Transportation-had all
determined that an individual should be evaluated for a disability in his or
her uncorrected or unmitigated state."'
The Court has "traditionally accorded respect" when an agency has
"played a pivotal role in setting [the statutory] machinery in motion."'59 In
153 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
1- See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
155 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
156 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app. § 1630.2(j0) (1998); 29 C.F.R pt. 35, app. A, § 35.104 (1998); see also
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984).
15 7 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, I., dissenting) (citations omitted).
158 Id.
159 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444
U.S. 555,566 (1980)).
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addition, when the "interpretations 'constitute a body of experience and
informedjudgment to which [the Court] may properly resort' for additional
guidance," it should do so.'16However, the majority's decision ignored this
principle. A dangerous system exists when the Court not only ignores the
legislative history and purpose of the Act, but also disregards the extensive
findings of governmental agencies that Congress has entrusted with the
authority to interpret the Act.
Why, then, did the Court decide to drastically limit the scope of the
ADA? The decision was purely an economic one. The majority's rationale
focused heavily on Congress's estimate of the number of disabled
individuals (forty-three million). 61 The majority, however, proved unable
to determine the exact source of this congressional estimate, but based its
decision upon the estimate nonetheless. The dissent correctly stated, "IThe
Court has been cowed by respondent's... argument that viewing all
individuals in their unmitigated state will lead to a tidal wave of
lawsuits."'62 Commentators have also been quick to point out the practical
impetus for the decision. For instance, one newsletter observed that the
Court's failure to rule that mitigating measures should be taken into
account "would cause the number of persons covered by the ADA to
expand exponentially.' 6 3 Thus, the Court, fearing that the ADA's wide
coverage presented a danger of a litigation explosion, limited the scope of
the Act.
Economics should not be a major concern of the Court. The Court's
duty is to uphold the Act's true purpose and evaluate the law through the
lens of this purpose. The Court ignored this duty in Sutton, at the expense
of many disabled Americans. Perhaps the only remaining redress for those
now-excluded handicapped individuals is to push for a statutory amend-
ment to the ADA codifying the inclusive intent made so clear by its
legislative history.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Is all hope lost for plaintiffs challenging discrimination under the
ADA? The question remains unanswered; however, an analysis of the
Sutton decision provides potential avenues for success.
11o Id. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
161 See id. at 484.
162 Id. at 508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 Kristen L. Brightmire, The U.S. Supreme Court Has Spoken, OKLA. EMP. L.
LETTER, July 1999, at 2.
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The decision will obviously change the manner in which employees
and employers interact and contest their positions under the ADA. It is
readily apparent that the trilogy of decisions by the Supreme Court
"substantially narrow[s] the definition of disability and therefore the
protections of the ADA."'6 Under these holdings, a plaintiff "may find
himself or herself in a no-win situation."' 65 That plaintiff, employing the
use ofa mitigating measure, "will be required to prove that the impairment,
considered with the corrective measure, substantially limits a major life
activity."'n Conversely, the"plaintiffmust [also] be careful not to establish
that the impairment is so 'substantially limiting' that it [renders him
unqualified for the position]."1 67 The Tenth Circuit's decision captured this
anomaly by stating:
Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They are either disabled because their
uncorrected vision substantially restricts their major [life] activity of
seeing and, thus, they are not qualified individuals forapilotposition with
United, or they are qualified for the position because their vision is
correctable and does not substantially limit their major life activity of
seeing. 16
8
In addition to this obstacle, a plaintiff must show that he is unable to
perform a wide range ofjobs. The Court held that the plaintiffs in Sutton
could not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working
because they were qualified for jobs other than global airline pilot.169 In
order to succeed under the ADA, plaintiffs must show that they are unable
to perform not only the job for which they are applying, but also a wide
range of jobs for which they are qualified given their background, skills,
and experience. 70 The inability to perform one specific job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.' 71
It seems that plaintiffs would have to present evidence-possibly skills
tests and vocational experts-to prove their limitations. Courts should be
'
68Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 89.
'
6suSsan E. Dallas, Sutton: Use ofMitigatingMeasures to Determine Disability
Under the ADA, 28 COLO. LAWYER 59, 61 (1999).
16 6 Id.
167 Id
"' Id. (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 903 (10th Cir.
1997), affid, 527 U.S. 471 (1999)).
169 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471,493 (1999).
170 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(i) (2000).
171 Id.
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vigilant in limiting the scope of the range ofjobs that can prevent an ADA
claim; otherwise, plaintiffs' right to choose their profession or trade will be
curtailed.
The federal circuits after Sutton will be forced to resolve some
remaining questions not addressed bythe decision. It appears that there are
at least two ways plaintiffs can structure their arguments to fit under the
post-Sutton ADA.
First, a plaintiff might show that the medications he or she is taking to
control his disability produce side effects that interfere with the ability to
work. This argument seems to be the most capable of minimizing the force
of the Sutton decision. Medications often cause side effects, such as
extreme drowsiness, headache, and nausea, and can have a cumulative
effect that is damaging to the ability to engage in major life activities. In
fact, Sutton provides guidance on this issue: if a person is mitigating an
impairment, "the effects of those measures-both positive and nega-
tive-must be taken into account" when determining whether a disability
exists." Justice O'Connor recognizedin Sutton that certain side effects can
be very severe. ' n Using this reasoning, lower court decisions construing
Sutton broadly would result in a larger class of plaintiffs who would be
eligible to claim discrimination under the ADA.
Plaintiffs, however, will be requiredto demonstrate that the side effects
of their corrective measure substantially limit a major life activity. The
EEOC has outlined three factors that should be considered in determining
what constitutes a substantial limitation of a major life activity: "(i) [t]he
nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he long-term impact of the
impairment." 74 An interesting question for courts in the future is whether
temporary side effects will be considered disabilities. The EEOC's
technical assistance manual for the ADA states that "[t]emporary, non-
chronic impairments that do not last for a long time and that have little or
no long term impact usually are not disabilities."17s The legislative history
172 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
1' Id. at 484. O'Connor cited three examples of very severe side effects: (1)
antipsychotic drugs that can cause neuroleptic malignant syndrome and painful
seizures, (2) drugs for Parkinson's disease that can lead to liver damage, and (3)
antiepileptic drugs with "serious negative side effects" Id. (citations omitted).
174 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (2000).
17s U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSiS-
TANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS
wrTH DISABELIEs ACT § 2.2(a)(iii) (1992).
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of the ADA, however, is conspicuously absent on this issue. 76 In addition,
courts cannot seem to agree whether a temporary side effect can constitute
a disability.'" Plaintiffs should closely watch the courts for guidance on
this decisive issue.
Second, a plaintiff could choose not to mitigate his disability. The
Court in Sutton held that a "'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could' or
'would' be substantially limiting ifmitigating measures were not taken."'
In recognizing that a disability determination is an individualized inquiry
that must be done in the individual's present state and not a potential or
hypothetical state, the Court leaves open the option for a plaintiff to choose
not to mitigate so that he may retain disabled status under the ADA.
Arguably, this is in fact what the Court's decision will drive plaintiffs to
do. For example, a person with bipolar disorder may chose not to take the
recommended drug lithium because of its side effects such as weight gain.
The choice between mitigating, which would result in no coverage by the
ADA, and not mitigating, which would result in coverage, may present a
difficult decision for some disabled individuals.
Relatedly, if a plaintiff chooses not to mitigate, can an employer
question the appropriateness of the employee's failure to use the mitigating
drug or device? It seems impossible that the Court would allow this action
by employers. Employees would be required to consult their employers
about treatment decisions, although most employers are ill-equipped to
determine the risks associated with certain mitigation devices or the
potential side effects from such mitigation. Furthermore, such employer
meddling intrudes upon an individual's right ofpersonal autonomy and the
freedom to choose one's own medical care. Courts in the future should be
sensitive to an individual's decision whether to mitigate or correct
disabilities.
CONCLUSION
What can advocates for disabled employees do? It may be possible to
dilute the limiting effects of Sutton in subsequent cases using the two
176 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition ofDisability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 475-76 (1997).
'7Compare, e.g., Graaf v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 318, 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), and Stronkowski v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., Civ. No.
3:94CV2175 AHN, 1996 WL 684407, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 1, 1996), with Aldrich
v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144
(1999).
11 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482 (1999).
2000-2001]
562 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 89
arguments mentioned above. That seems a difficult task. It may be that the
only means to address this issue is for Congress to amend the ADA. The
trilogy of decisions, all 7-2 votes, forecloses the possibility of judicial
modification in the near future. The need for balance between economic or
other consequences (including the burdensome litigation that concerned
both the ADA's advocates and critics alike) and the protection intended by
the Act seems lost in Sutton. Congress may have to restore this balance by
statutory amendment.
Has this pronouncement by the Supreme Court left the ADA with little
clout in the workplace? Has it cost disabled persons their protection against
employment discrimination in the workplace? These questions can only be
answered as the lower courts begin to apply the Sutton decision, as the true
impact and scope of Sutton will lie in its application. Whatever its final
legacy, Sutton has certainly changed the face ofthe ADA's protections and
removed the shield of legal protection from a large class of people.
